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THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE: RECOVERING
ITS MEANING TWENTY YEARS LATER
David Rudenstine*
INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago—June 1971—^the Nixon Administration sued
the New York Times^ in an eflfort to bar it from further publishing
excerpts from a top-secret Pentagon study^ that traced United States
involvement in Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1968. It was the first
time in the history of our republic that the national government
sought to restrain the press from publishing information it ^ready
possessed because of national security considerations.^ During the
brief sixteen days'' that it took the federal courts to resolve the dis© David Rudenstine 1991.
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I wish to thank Dean Monroe
Price for his support of this project and the Jacob Bums Institute for Advanced Legal Studies
for the financial assistance it has provided. I also wish to thank several Cardozo studentsRobin Flicker, Kathy McLaughlin, David Katz, Jaime Bloom, and Maria Whitman—for thenassistance in footnoting this article.
This article is drawn from D. RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HIS
TORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE, to be published by the University of California Press.
1 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). On June 18, 1971, three days
after the govemment initiated suit against the Times, it commenced a prior restraint action
against the Washington Post. These actions were consolidated before the Supreme Court.
2 This report, which was classified "Top Secret-Sensitive," became popularly known ^
the Pentagon Papers. It was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in
June 1967, and completed in January 1969. There are three published versions of the Penta
gon Papers: BEACON PRESS, THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HIS
TORY OF UNITED STATES DECISIONMAKING ON VIETNAM: THE SENATOR GRAVEL EDITION
(1971) (in four volumes); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, UNITED
STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS, 1945-1967: STUDY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DE
FENSE (1971) (in twelve volumes); N. SHEEHAN, H. SMITH, E. KENWORTHY & P. BUTTERFIELD, THE PENTAGON PAPERS AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES (1971). None of
these versions contained the four volumes of the original study, which was bound in fortyseven volumes, that traced the diplomatic history of the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1968.
These four volumes were eventually declassified, except for a relatively small amount of mate
rial, and are now published. See G. HERRING, THE SECRET DIPLOMACY OF THE VIETNAM
WAR: THE NEGOTIATING VOLUMES OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS (1985).
3 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring). A judicial order barring the
press from publishing material it possesses is termed a prior restraint. Historically, prior re
straints have been greatly disfavored because of their deep intrusion into first amendment val
ues. See generally Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 11 (1981). Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
648 (1955). For an examination of the reasons the administration claimed warranted a prior
restraint action in the Times case, see infra notes 137-210 and accompanying text.
* The action against the Times was begun on June 15, 1971, and the Supreme Court's
decision was announced on June 30, 1971.
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pute, two district courts held evidentiary hearings,' two other district
courts restrained as many other newspapers from publishing reports
based on the classified study,® two courts of appe^s sitting en banc
reviewed district court judgments,'' and the Supreme Court Justices
ruled six to three in favor of the press, writing no less than ten
opinions.®
The Pentagon Papers Case, as it became popularly known as,
was the subject of considerable commentary in the daily press and
weekly news magazines during the litigation and immediately after
wards. While the matter was in the courts, the prior restraint action
overshadowed the story of the Pentagon's classified study itself and
was regular front page copy for newspapers and magazines. Following
the conclusion of the legal proceedings, the action against the press
was the subject of conferences, reflective news commentary, law re
view articles, and books.®
Although there has been a wealth of writing about the case, its
significance as one of the most extraordinary affirmations of free press
values has never been fully appreciated. Generally, students of the
field have concluded that what was important about the outcome of
this historic litigation was that the government lost. What is meant by
this abbreviated critique is that the government's evidentiary basis for
the relief it sought was exceedingly weak or non-existent ("far' United States v. Washington Post, No. 71 Civ. 1235 (D.D.C. June 21, 1971); United
States V. New York Times, No. 71 Civ. 2662 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1971).
® A federal district judge issued a temporary restraining order against the Boston Globe on
June 22, 1971. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1971, at Al, col. 5. Similarly, the5t. Louis Post Dispatch
was restrained from further publication of the Pentagon study on June 26. N.Y. Times, June
27, 1971, at A27, col. 3.
1 United States v. New York Times, No. 71-1617 (2d Cir. June 23, 1971) (en banc);
United States v. Washington Post, 446 F.2d. 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc).
® New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Each justice wrote individually
in addition to a short per curiam opinion. Id.
' For a sampling of legal commentary on the Pentagon Papers Case, see Fiss, Free Speech
and The Prior Restaint Doctrine: The Pentagon Papers Case, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1972). Kalven, The Supreme Court 1970 Term Foreword: Even When a
Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1971); Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the
Pentagon Papers, 15 J. OF LAW REFORM 497 (1982); Rubin, Foreign Policy, Secrecy and The
First Amendment: The Pentagon Papers in Retrospect, 17 How. L.J. 579 (1972). There are
three books which discuss the case at length. See S. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS:
AN ACCOUNT OF THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE PENTAGON PAPERS
(1972). This was written immediately following the litigation, and is the only book exclusively
devoted to the case. See also P. SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY: DANIEL ELLSBERG AND THE
RITUALS OF SECRET GOVERNMENT (1974) and H. SALISBURY, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR:
THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ITS TIMES (1980). The former is a history of the government's
prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg, but it contains substantial material on the prior restraint ac
tions. The latter is a history of the Times that devotes substantial material on the article
against the Times, especially from the Time's perspective.
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fetched" was one respected observer's adjective'"), and that if the ad
ministration had prevailed under these circumstances, it would have
meant that the Court had deviated from established legal norms that
favored freedom of the press in favor of repressive ones.
Many reasons explain this misconception of the case. The study
itself was labeled a history and it ceased with events in 1968, thus
giving strength to the perception that the documents in question did
not implicate on-going military or diplomatic events. The transcripts
and briefs, in which the government set forth its reasons as to why a
prior restraint was required to protect the nation's security, were
sealed during the litigation and remained so many years thereafter."
As a result, no one commenting on the case has had the opportunity
to study the government's claims.'^ Because the judges and Justices
who wrote opinions in the case respected the government's claims
that the disputed material threatened serious national security consid
erations, they did not review the government's allegations and evi
dence in their published opinions.'^ The Supreme Court Justices
lacked time to agree upon a majority opinion; instead, they wrote in
dividual opinions and six of them joined in a short per curiam opin
ion.''' Given the history of President Nixon's acrimonious relations
with the press and the aggressive attacks on it during his presidency,"
it was tempting—one might say irresistible—to conclude that the
legal oflfensive against the New York Times and other newspapers was
simply part of a coordinated campaign to repress the press.'® The
government's well publicized penchant for abusing the classification
process strengthened public suspicion towards the government's alle
gations that the classified Pentagon Papers study contained informa
tion that would jeopardize national security if made public." After
Fiss, supra note 9, at SI. (Professor Piss's complete statement was: "But these explana
tions seem now, as they did then, farfetched.").
'1 The sealed record was initially unsealed at the request of Anthony Lewis, the New York
Times columnist, who initiated government review of the court papers during President
Carter's administration. Through the cooperation of former U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani
and former Solicitor General Charles Fried, I secured the unsealing of additional court papers.
Some phrases, sentences, and paragraphs remain sealed.
•2 The only exception to this is Salisbury, who appears to have had access to the oncesealed transcript of the evidentiary hearing held before Judge Gurfein on June 18, 1971. See
H. SALISBURY, supra note 9, at 304-08.
See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Id.; see also discussion, infra notes 249-257 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
The existence of such a coordinated campaign was affirmed by William Satire. See W.
SAFIRE, BEFORE THE FALL: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE PRE-WATERGATE WHITE HOUSE 341
(1975).
I'' See generally M. HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1977); Halloran, Secrecy Label Is Used Too Often By Pentagon, Ex-
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the Court permitted the press to continue to publish the top secret
documents and the material was made public, no one perceived the
shock waves of harm that the Nixon Administration had predicted
would reverberate.'®
In this anniversary article,my main focus is on the legal signifi
cance of the Pentagon Papers Case. I maintain that the important
meaning of the case has been drastically discounted. The Supreme
Court's decision should not only be understood as a significant affir
mation of the right of the press to be free of censorship, but it should
also be viewed as one of the most important judicial decisions protect
ing the press from governmental censorship ever reached by any court
in any western democracy.
Even though my primary effort is aimed at recovering the case's
significant legal meaning, I also briefly assess its political importance.
The Nixon Administration's decision to sue the Times constituted a
dramatic turning point in the Nixon Presidency, and ultimately led to
events that prompted Nixon to engage in a cover-up following the
break-in of the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate,
which in turn forced him to resign the Presidency.^" Furthermore,
this historic litigation constitutes a strong affirmation of democratic
values in the ideological struggle between national security with its
demands for secrecy, and democracy with its requirement for ac
countable political processes.^'
I.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S REASONS FOR SUING THE TIMES

It is important to fully explore the reasons for the administra
tion's decision to take the legal offensive. This is true because failure
Aide Testifies, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1971, § 1 at 12, col. 6. As it turned out, the Nixon Ad
ministration all but conceded during the litigation that it was prepared to declassify much of
the study, but it insisted that it needed forty-five to ninety days to review the 2.5 million words
so that the information that it believed threatened national security could be safeguarded.
Rosenbaum, Review of Report Proposed by U.S., N.Y. Times, June 23, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
Rosenthal, What a Free Press Is All About, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1972, § 4 at 6, col. 1.
But see infra note 221.
This article draws on much material not previously publicly available. I have had access
to the once sealed record in the case (see supra note 11) and to the notes and memoranda
prepared by Nixon and his former White House aides which were recently made public at
former President Richard Nixon's archives (Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Alexandria,
Virginia). I have conducted thirty interviews with former members of the Nixon and Johnson
Administrations, as well as others. This article also utilizes material obtained from the case
files of former Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas (all at the Manuscript Collection at the Li
brary of Congress), and Harlan (Manuscript Collection at Princeton University Library), as
well as communications with Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger.
20 See infra notes 275-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
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to accept the fact that national security considerations had a signifi
cant impact on the administration's decision to seek a prior restraint
obscures the significance of the Times's (as well as the Post's) ultimate
triumph in the Supreme Court. If the government is thought to have
brought the lawsuit merely as part of a campaign against the press, it
becomes more difficult to believe that the government had a reason
ably strong claim for a prior restraint, and that the newspapers' vic
tory in the Supreme Court was any more than a prosaic application of
well established law in a case where the evidence introduced by the
government lawyers was weak. But if the government is seen as hav
ing initiated the prior restraint action because of legitimate national
security concerns, it becomes more credible that the Nixon Adminis
tration had substantial legal grounds for the ruling it sought. From
this perspective, the Supreme Court's judgment in favor of the news
papers takes on a wholly different meaning; it becomes an extraordi
nary decision in which the Supreme Court preferred the newspapers'
right to publish over reasonable objections that further publication
seriously threatened the national security.
The common behef at the time was^^ (and still is^') that the ad
ministration sued the Times for a prior restraint to intimidate the
press.^'* In The Politics of Lying," David Wise cited the prior re
straint action as a prime example of the Nixon Administration's "un
precedented effort ... to downgrade and discredit the American
press.
A 1971 report of the American Civil Liberties Union writ
ten by Fred Powledge characterized the prior restraint action as the
"most dramatic" part of the Nixon Administration's campaign
against press freedoms.^^ The following year, Sanford Unger reported
that the "strong presumption of legal observers was that ... it was
impossible to view the crisis over the Pentagon Papers in perspective
without considering the overt hostility of the Nixon administration
toward the press and the inhibiting effect that hostility had
22 See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
22 2 S. AMBROSE, NIXON—THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN 1962-1972 (1989); H.
PARMET, RICHARD NIXON AND HIS AMERICA (1990).
24 Although the most common view was that the Nixon Administration sued the Times to
repress the press, others have expressed differing opinions. For example, the investigative re
porter Seymour Hersh has asserted: "The Pentagon Papers posed no threat to national security
but provided a vital opportunity to score political points against the antiwar movement and the
liberal Democrats." S. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE
HOUSE 386 (1983).
25 D. WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND POWER
(1973).
26 Id. at 17.
22 F. POWLEDGE, THE ENGINEERING OF RESTRAINT: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
AND THE PRESS 15 (1971).
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produced."^®
This belief was understandable. Nixon viewed the press as the
enemy and hated it.^^ As William Safire confessed after years of
working closely with Nixon, "I must have heard Richard Nixon say
'the press is the enemy' a dozen times.
By the time Nixon became
President, his acrimonious and distrustful relations with the press
were long standing and well known. Indeed, many of his confronta
tions with the press had become common political reference points.
Perhaps the most famous of these were his "Checkers" speech in 1952
(when he tried to save his position as Eisenhower's vice-presidential
running mate in the face of reports of a secret slush fund),^' and his
"last press conference" (after he lost the 1962 California gubernato
rial election) in which he told the press: "You won't have Nixon to
kick around anymore.
Nixon's actions after he assumed the Presidency further sup
ported the view that the prior restraint action was part of an offensive
against the press. In the fall of 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew
delivered several speeches that encouraged the public to distrust and
discredit the national press services.^^ This was paralleled by intimi
dating inquiries of the television networks by Dean Burch, whom
Nixon had only recently appointed to head the Federal Communica
tions Commission.^"* Federal investigators subpoenaed the files, in
cluding unused photographs, of national news magazines as part of
ongoing criminal investigations.^' Reporters were brought before
grand juries and asked to reveal their sources.'® When these actions
were viewed in the light of Attorney General John Mitchell's best
remembered public statement ("You'd be better informed if, instead
of listening to what we say, you watch what we do"),'' the adminis
tration's purpose in suing the Times may have seemed self-evident.
Nevertheless, all the evidence (and only some of it can be re
viewed in these pages), suggests that it is a mistake to interpret the
Nixon administration's decision to sue the Times for a prior restraint
as intended to advance—either solely or mainly—the administration's
28 S. UNGAR, supra note 9, at 114.
29 W. SAFIRE, supra note 16.
30 Id. at 342.
31 R. MORRIS, RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON: THE RISE OF AN AMERICAN POLITICIAN 810
(1990).
32 1 s. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN 1913-1962, at 671 (1987).
33 D. WISE, supra note 25, at 231; F. POWLEDGE, supra note 27, at 8.
34 F. POWLEDGE, supra note 27, at 11.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 11-12.
32 w. SAFIRE, supra note 16, at 265.
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war against the press. Unquestionably, it was not long after legal pro
ceedings began that some members within the administration began to
view the lawsuit precisely in such terms. But these considerations
were not initially responsible for driving the administration to under
take legal action.^' Rather, the reasons behind the prior restraint ac
tion were more complicated and subtle, and included substantial
national security considerations.'*®
* * *

Nixon learned of the Times report only on Sunday morning, and
he was completely surprised by it.'** Not only had he been unaware
that the Times had the papers, he did not even know of the existence
of the Pentagon's secret history until he read about it in the newspa
per.'*^ Nevertheless, the surprise of the publication did not dissipate
Nixon's good spirits following his daughter's wedding the day
before.'*^
Nixon met with H.R. Haldeman, his primary White House aide,
at 10:00 A.M. Sunday in the oval office.'** Haldeman made copious
notes of Nixon's remarks as he routinely did whenever he met with
the President. For a brief five minutes, Nixon discussed the wedding,
the tensions between Pakistan and India, Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird's recent effective support of the President, and the Times report.
Nixon told Haldeman that the Times report was "really tough" on
Kennedy; it made "victims" of Kennedy, McNamara, and Johnson; it
made Walt Rostow the "key villain"; it "hurt the war" and "will
cause terrible problems with SVN [South Vietnam]"; and it was
"criminally traitorous" for someone to turn the documents over to
the Times and for the Times to publish them. But Nixon emphasized
to Haldeman that the Times publication "doesn't hurt us," that "we
need to keep clear of the Times series," and that the "key is for us to
keep out of it."*^
Unlike his strong emotional reaction to so many news reports,'*®
Nixon's initial response to the Times Pentagon Papers report was re
strained. He understood that the report damaged the Kennedy and
38 J. LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 70-71 (1976).
39 See infra notes 41-136 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 62-136 and accompanying text.
41 H. KLEIN, MAKING IT PERFECTLY CLEAR: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF NIXON'S LOVE
HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEDIA 344 (1980).
42 The Secret History of Vietnam, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1971, at 12.
43 H. SALISBURY, supra note 9, at 216.
44 Handwritten notes by H.R. Haldeman, June 13, 1971, Box 43, The Nixon Presidential
Materials Project, Alexandria, Va. [hereinafter Haldeman Notes].
45 Id.
46 2 S. AMBROSE, supra note 23, at 325-26.
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Johnson Administrations as well as the Democratic Party in general.
He knew that it would make it more difficult for his administration to
execute his war policies. But Nixon did not believe that the Times
publication hurt his own administration, and he saw no political, dip
lomatic or national security reason to take any steps to interfere with
the daily newspaper's publication plans.
Mid-Sunday afternoon, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national secur
ity advisor, challenged Nixon's decision to let the Times go forward
with its publication plan without interference when they had a thir
teen minute, long-distance telephone conversation.'*"' Neither Nixon
nor Kissinger has publicly disclosed the details of this call, but Kis
singer has admitted that he "encouraged" Nixon to oppose "this
wholesale theft and unauthorized disclosure."*® In addition, Haldeman has maintained that Kissinger, who "really knew how to get to
Nixon," told Nixon that his decision to do nothing "shows you're a
weakling, Mr. President."*' According to Haldeman, Kissinger ar
gued that Nixon's decision to "keep out of it" indicated that the Presi
dent "didn't understand how dangerous the release of the Pentagon
Papers was.'"° Kissinger claimed that
the fact that some idiot can publish all of the diplomatic secrets of
this country on his own is damaging to your image, as far as the
Soviets are concerned, and it could destroy our ability to conduct
foreign policy. If other powers feel that we can't control internal
leaks, they will never agree to secret negotiations.''
Kissinger's prodding influenced Nixon. By early Monday morn
ing, Nixon's reaction to the Times publication had changed dramati
cally.'^ He was now seething, furious at the Times and at whomever
was responsible for the leak. And he wanted something done about
President Richard Nixon's Daily Diary, June 13, 1971, Box FC 26, Nixon Archives
[hereinafter Nixon's Daily Diary].
^8 H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 730 (1979).
H. HALDEMAN, THE ENDS OF POWER 110 (1978) (quoting H. Kissinger).
50 Id.
5' Id. John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, two important White House aides, share
Haldeman's view that Kissinger pushed Nixon into retaliating against the Times. Ehrlichman
has written that Kissinger "fanned Richard Nixon's flame white-hot" and claimed that
"[wjithout Henry's stimulus during the June 13 to July 6 period, the President and the rest of
us might have concluded that the Papers were Lyndon Johnson's problem, not ours. After all
there was not a word about Richard Nixon in any of the forty-three volumes." J. ERLICHMAN,
WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 301-02 (1982). Colson has quoted Kissinger as
charging that there "can be no foreign policy in this government" because these "leaks are
slowing and systematically destroying us", and insisting that "the President must act—today."
C. COLSON, BORN AGAIN 57-58 (1976).
52 Haldeman Notes, supra note 44, June 14, 1971.
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it."
Nixon told Haldeman to find out what the statute of limitations
was on criminally prosecuting the Times. He had not decided that
criminal charges should be brought against the Times—that decision
would have to await a complete legal analysis—^but he wanted the
possibility evaluated."
Nixon also instructed Haldeman to have the administration take
the offensive against those who had leaked the report." Nixon or
dered Haldeman to focus on Leslie Gelb, the former Pentagon Paper's
staff director; on others who had worked on the project; and on the
Brookings Institute, which he considered a center for anti-administra
tion activity.'® Nixon also directed Haldeman to limit the Times ac
cess to the administration.'^ He told Haldeman to be "tougher" with
the Times and that it was now time to "really cut them off.'"®
Though he cautioned Haldeman that no one should do anything obvi
ous, he emphasized that he wanted the Times access to the White
House strictly limited." As furious as Nixon was with Times on
Monday morning, however, he did not consider the possibility of su
ing the Times for a prior restraint.®" That had to wait until the Jus
tice Department made the suggestion.®'
* * *

Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General for Internal Secur
ity Affairs, knew nothing about the Times's Pentagon Papers series
until he reached his office Monday morning, having just arrived in
Washington from Los Angeles on the red eye.®^ When he read the
Times Monday edition, he was alarmed by its national security ramifi
cations.®' He sent for the Sunday Times and consulted with Mitchell
and officials from the Departments of State and Defense to determine
the publication's effect on national security and diplomatic relations.®*
Mardian had no trouble persuading John Mitchell, the Attorney
General, that the Times publication required Justice Department re53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 W.
61 See infra notes 62-135 and accompanying text.
62 S. UNGAR, supra note 9, at 108.
63 Id
64 Id; Interview with Robert Mardian, former Assistant Attorney General, in Washing
ton, D.C. (June 2, 1988) [hereinafter Mardian Interview].
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view. Mitchell liked Mardian and shared his political outlook; as
Mitchell remembered years later, Mardian was "a very bright lawyer
in whom I have the greatest confidence."®' They decided to establish
several task forces working under Mardian's direction, drawing law
yers from different parts of the Justice Department to staff" them.®®
The task forces evaluated different questions: the potential criminal
liability of the Times and its source for publishing the Pentagon Pa
pers; the scope and character of the Pentagon Papers study itself; the
national security consequences of the Times publication; and the
drafting of various legal documents in the event that the administra
tion decided to initiate legal proceedings against the Times. Mitchell
and Mardian chose William H. Rehnquist, then an assistant Attorney
General, to head another task force to evaluate the government's
chances of securing an injunction that would stop the Times from
publishing future installments of its Pentagon Papers series.®' RehnInterview with John Mitchell, former United States Attorney General, in Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 6, 1988) [hereinafter Mitchell Interview],
Mardian Interview, supra note 64. Mitchell by-passed both the Justice Department's
Civil and Criminal Divisions when he told Mardian to direct and coordinate the review of the
Times publication. He had several reasons for doing so. He trusted Mardian, and the admin
istration's reaction to the Times publication was potentially political dynamite. He thought
that the subject matter clearly touched on security matters: The Times was publishing classi
fied, top secret documents that bore upon a war in progress. As of Monday morning, Mitch
ell—neither did Nixon or Mardian for that matter—did not have a clear idea whether the
administration would initiate legal proceedings against the Times, and if it did, whether the
proceeding would be civil or criminal. There was certainly a possibility that a review of the
legal alternatives would persuade Mitchell and his aides that the administration should take no
legal steps against the Times. Id.; Mitchell Interview, supra note 65.
Monday, June 14, was Rehnquist's first day in the office following back surgery, and he
worked only half a day. Interview with William H. Rehnquist, former Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Rehn
quist Interview]. Nevertheless, the fact that Mardian asked him to evaluate the law of prior
restraint meant that he would play a disproportionately important role as the administration
decided how to react to the Times publication. Id.
Although he almost certainly read a number of relevant Supreme Court opinions, Rehn
quist best remembers reading Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the leading Supreme
Court case on prior restraint decided forty years earlier. Rehnquist Interview, supra. In Near,
a Minneapolis county attorney sued a local newspaper. The Saturday Press, its editors and
publisher for publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles" which in substance
stated that "a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in
Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically performing
their duties." 283 U.S. at 703-04. The state supreme court affirmed the lower court order
permanently enjoining the newspaper from further publication and the individual defendants
from editing, publishing, circulating or selling any publication that was malicious, scandalous
or defamatory. Id. at 706. By a five to four vote, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the Minnesota court. Id. at 697.
Rehnquist, in his interview stated that he was interested in that portion of Chief Justice
Hughes's majority opinion that discussed the circumstances in which a court may grant a prior
restraint. Although Hughes wrote that the "chief purpose" of the first amendment was to
guard against prior restraints, he conceded that courts may grant them "in exceptional cases."
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quist advised his Justice Department colleagues that a prior restraint
was theoretically available, and that the administration's chances of
securing one depended upon the evidence it could present to support
its claim for relief—evidence that he did not evaluate.^®
Near, 283 U.S. at 716. Hughes quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' familiar statement tlwt
"[w]hen a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hin
drance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight." Id. {quoting
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). Hughes also stated that he thought that a
prior restraint could be secured to: stop "obscene publications"; secure community life against
"incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government ; bar
" 'words that may have the effect of force' and "prevent actual obstruction [of governmen
tal] recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops." Id.
.
• i. u
Although Hughes did not detail the circumstances as to when a prior restraint might be
available, what he wrote allowed Rehnquist to emphasize that the on-going war in Vietnam
..ntianpf/t the Administration's chances of securing one. It also permitted him to advise that if
the Times publication threatened national security in a way comparable to the examples of
fered by Hughes in Near, that would seem to offer the possibility for the administration to
secure a prior restraint stopping the Times from further publishing the classified history. In
writing his memorandum, Rehnquist made no evaluation of the harm to national security
resulting from the Times publication, and he never reviewed the Pentagon Papers study itself.
Rehnquist Interview, supra.
The importance of Rehnquist's role that Monday did not depend upon exceptional legal
ability. There was nothing remarkably insightful about his conclusion that Hughes's opinion
in Near did not completely close the door on prior restraint; Hughes had specifically so stated.
Rather the significance of Rehnquist's role depended upon his influence within the administra
tion. That influence certainly reflected the general perception that he was a lawyer of superior
ability. But it was also based on his conservative political credentials. Rehnquist had been a
strong supporter of Barry Goldwater in 1964. He was also considered politically loyal within
the Nixon Administration, having vigorously defended the invasion of Cambodia and sup
ported Nixon's law-and-order measures, including the right to wiretap citizens when national
security was involved. Although Nixon called him a "clown" because of his pink shirts and
his sideburns, J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 50-51 (1976), and
although he could not pronounce his name correctly (Renchburg), J. LUKAS, supra note 38, at
512, Rehnquist's judgment on legal questions was very respected at the Justice Department
and the White House. As Kleindienst wrote in explaining why Nixon nominated Rehnquist to
the Supreme Court: "For over two and a half years he discharged the difficult requirements of
his position with such distinction that he was indeed regarded by all as the lawyer for the
Department of Justice, as well as for the executive branch." R. KLEINDIENST, JUSTICE: THE
MEMOIRS OF AN ATTORNEY GENERAL 22 (1985). Ehrlichman's memoirs contain a similar
view: "In 1969, when I was [White House] Counsel, I sent him more than a few tough ques
tions, mixed issues of law and politics, and he handled them well, with a sensitivity to the
President's objectives and to the practicalities of our situation." J. EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS
THE POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 136 (1982).
The importance of what Rehnquist did that Monday was not the fact that he provided
information about prior Supreme Court decisions to his Justice Department colleagues,
although that was surely useful. No administration had ever tried to secure a prior restraint
either before or after Hughes wrote his opinion in Near. That meant that in the minds of most
people the nation's political tradition—which did not include instances of prior restraint
overshadowed Hughes's summary of formal legal rules. But given the unusual respect that
was accorded him as "the" administration's lawyer, Rehnquist's conclusion helped legitima
tize within the administration the possibility of putting forward an unprecedented legal claim.
Rehnquist Interview, supra note 67; Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
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* * *

While Rehnquist evaluated the law of prior restraint, Mardian
and his aides encountered many obstacles as they assessed the na
tional security consequences of the Times publication.®' The State
Department was of little to no help to Mardian. As the department's
spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, told news reporters early Monday
morning, it was "difficult" for the department to comment on the
classified history because it was unable to determine even if it had a
copy of it.'°
Secretary of State William Rogers, apparently influenced by for
eign leaders who were upset by the Times disclosures and who com
plained to the State Department, told Mitchell, as Mitchell recalled
many years later, that further publication of the Pentagon Papers by
the Times was "inimical to the national interest.""" Rogers also told
Mardian that he was "outraged" by the Times publication, and ad
vised the Assistant Attorney General to sue the newspaper in an "ac
tion in replevin"—^ legal action to regain possession of stolen
property."'^
The White House was no more help to Mardian than the State
Department. Only Henry Kissinger" and Alexander Haig" had any
first hand knowledge of the study. But Kissinger had spent Monday
flying from California to Washington." And Haig may not have told
anyone that he was familiar with the study." Indeed, Haig may not
even have volunteered to his White House colleagues that a copy of
the classified history was in the National Security Council safe." As
for Nixon's other White House aides, the existence of the study was a
mystery, as Herbert Klein, Nixon's Communications Director,
Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at A18, col. 6. Only later in the day, after the study was
found in the personal files of William P. Bundy, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Johnson Administration, were department analysts in a
position to begin reviewing the enormous document. But whatever efforts these analysts might
have made (and it is unclear whether they made any), Mardian does not remember ever receiv
ing an evaluation of the defense and diplomatic consequences of the Times publication from
the State Department. Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
Mitchell Interview, supra note 65.
•^2 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
'3 S. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 321, foot
note (1983).
Id. at 386.
•'S H. SALISBURY, supra note 9, at 235.
Id. at 228, footnote.
H. KLEIN, surpa note 41, at 344, It was Klein's impression that when White House staff
members tried to determine what the administration should do in response to the Times re
port, there was "more confusion within the White House than at any other time" during his
tenure. Id.
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characterized it7® Mardian does not recall receiving any reports,
evaluations or recommendations from White House aides, including
Haig and Kissinger; he simply pursued his own appraisal on that hec
tic Monday
In contrast to the White House and State Department, the De
fense Department was in a position to help Mardian evaluate the risks
to national security posed by the Times report. The study was pre
pared at the Pentagon, and although no one who had worked on the
study was still employed there, the department had several copies of
the study. In addition. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and at least
one of his aides were familiar with its contents.®"
Laird's position fluctuated that Monday as the administration
decided what to do. Mitchell remembered that Laird telephoned him
to report that further publication by the Times would harm national
defense.®' But Laird recently denied that he ever offered that assess
ment to Mitchell or to anyone else in the administration.®^ Laird con
tended that he was glad the papers were in the public domain for he
felt that they strengthened his policy recommendations that the
United States should pull its troops out of South Vietnam far more
quickly than it was doing.®®
As pleased as Laird might have been that the papers were out, he
was sufficiently loyal to the Nixon Administration to make a public
statement in which he asserted that the Pentagon Papers contained
"highly sensitive information and should not have been made pub78 Id.
79 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
80 On November II, 1969, Senator William Fulbright requested of Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird that the Pentagon's classified history be declassified and made available to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Laird denied this request in a letter dated December 20,
1969. The Senator wrote the Defense Secretary repeating this request on January 19, 1970,
April 20, 1970, and July 20, 1970. The Defense Secretary never acceded to the Senator's
request. 116 CONG. REC. S27,827-28 (1970) (correspondence between Fulbright and Laird);
see also Naughton, Laird Refused '69 Fulbright Request for the Pentagon Study on Vietnam,
N.Y. Times, June 17, 1971, at A18, col. 6. In considering the Senator's request, the Defense
Secretary asked Dennis James Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, to review the classified study and make a recommendation. United States v.
New York Times, 71 Civ. 2662 at 56 (S.D.N. Y. 1971) (unpublished transcript of evidentiary
hearing).
81 Mitchell Interview, supra note 77.
82 Interview with Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense (Mar. 6, 1989) [hereinafter
Laird Interview].
83 Id. Mardian indirectly has supported Laird's contention. Mardian has accused Laird of
"foot-dragging" on that critical Monday. He has claimed that he asked Laird to have the
Pentagon review the national security threat posed by the Times publication, and that he
never received this report. Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
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lie."®'* Laird also criticized the paper's release on the ground that na
tional energies should be directed toward extricating the United States
from Vietnam, not raking "over the coals" of past policies.®'
What seems plausible is that Laird had two somewhat opposing
reactions to the Times report. He was genuinely upset about the
threat to national security posed by the possibility that the Times
would publish material that seriously disrupted diplomatic initiatives
or information he believed contained important intelligence matters.®®
But he was also pleased that the newspaper had published the classi
fied material. As a result, Laird probably expressed to Mitchell his
worry that the Times might publish something harmful to the na
tional security, but stopped short of urging Mitchell to sue the news
paper. But given the haste with which these conversations were
conducted, Mitchell probably understood Laird's qualified concerns
to mean that further publication by the Times would jeopardize na
tional security, and then passed that judgment along to Mardian as
further evidence that the administration must act.
Mardian met still other difficulties as he tried to assess the na
tional security risks presented by the Times publication. No one in
the Justice Department was familiar with the Pentagon Papers study;
indeed, neither Mardian, nor Mitchell, nor any of their aides even
knew of the study before the Times broke the story of the secret his
tory.®^ Moreover, the two experienced some delay in trying to secure
one of the small number of copies of the study then in existence.®®
But when they did receive it, they were nothing short of overwhelmed
by the study's forty-seven volumes containing over 2.5 million words.
It was clear that no lawyer at the Justice Department could quickly
read the study from cover to cover and identify particular passages
that were injurious to the national security. As a result, Mitchell and
Mardian both recalled that they never even attempted to review the
study once it arrived at the Justice Department.®' What Mardian did
decide was that he would have to rely upon the judgments of others in
trying to assess the risks to national security presented by the Times
publication.'®
Government officials advising Mardian and his aides were them84 Frankel, Mitchell Seeks to Halt Series on Vietnam But Times Refuses: Court Step Likely,
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at A18, col. 5.
85 Iti.
86 Laird Interview, supra note 82.
87 Mitchell Interview, supra note 65; Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
88 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
89 Id.; Mitchell Interview, supra note 65.
90 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
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selves disadvantaged since they were not able to determine precisely
which documents the Times had.®' In its Sunday news report, the
Times announced that it possessed "most" of the Pentagon Papers
study, described as consisting of 3,000 pages of analysis and 4,000
pages of official documents, but it did not offer more details.®^
Although a Times report stated that the newspaper was missing four
volumes of the study that detailed the history of diplomatic relations
from 1964 to 1968, the government officials assumed for the purpose
of advising Mardian that either the Times had the entire study or that
it might still obtain those sections the newspaper stated it did not
have.®'
Moreover, as government officials reviewed the Times report,
they concluded that the Times had documents in addition to the Pen
tagon Papers. They identified some of the documents as early drafts
of what became the final version of the Pentagon Papers.®'' They knew
that others were part of a classified study on the Tonkin Gulf incident
—a document prepared by the Defense Department's Weapons Sys
tem Evaluation Group in 1965.®' But there were still other papers
that they could not identify at all.®® It was difficult enough for Mard
ian, his aides, and defense officials to assess the national security
threat posed by a 7,000 page secret history of the war. But to assess
the risk to national security posed by the publication of documents
that could not be identified was an impossible task.
* * *

For several reasons, Mardian and his aides eventually concluded
that the Times publication threatened the nation's security. Mardian
and his aides concluded that publication by the Times of material de
tailing diplomatic efforts to end the war and to secure the release of
the prisoners of war would have grave consequences.®^ The study re
viewed the evolution of the Johnson Administration's policies toward
a negotiated settlement and the sporadic diplomatic contacts between
the United States and North Vietnam. In addition, it traced efforts by
91 Id.
92 Sheehan, Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involve
ment, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
93 Smith, Vast Review of War Took a Year, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, § 1, at 1, col. 4;
Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
9^ Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
95 Id. See also United States v. New York Times, 71 Civ. 2662 at 48 (S.D.N.Y. June 18,
1971) (transcript of unpublished in camera evidentiary hearing) (Frances J. Blouin).
96 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
97 Id.-, Telephone Interview with Jerry W. Friedheim, former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs (Mar. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Friedheim Interview]; Mardian Inter
view, supra note 64.
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numerous other nations to bring the two antagonists to the conference
table. For example, four volumes described separate efforts by two
Canadians, Blair Seaborn and Chester Ronning, to bring about settle
ment talks; the initiatives undertaken by Poland, and codenamed
MARIGOLD; the overture named SUNFLOWER which involved a
direct United States approach to North Vietnam in Moscow, and par
allel attempts by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Soviet
Premier Alexei Kosygin to begin peace talks; a series of peace moves
from early 1967 through early 1968 in which Norway, Sweden, Ru
mania and Italy took turns as intermediaries; and an attempt by
Henry Kissinger, acting as a private citizen at the behest of the United
States government, to arrange talks with North Vietnam through two
French intermediaries.'®
As Mardian explained years later, publication of material focus
ing on diplomatic matters would embarrass the political leaders of
Sweden, Canada and other countries." His characterization of Swe
den's role illustrated his point: "Sweden ostensibly was hosting antiVietnam [war] conferences in Sweden and putting on a face to the
North Vietnamese that they were against us, but at the same time
(they) were doing our bidding.'""® Sweden was "whoring for us" by
publicly condemning us and yet they were "carrying our baggage to
the North Vietnamese.'""'
G. HERRING, supra note 2.
Although Mardian and Mitchell were unaware of it at the time, most of the diplomatic
initiative covered in the study were, as one student of the subject has concluded, "described in
some detail and with remarkable accuracy in contemporary newspaper accounts and in such
books as Kraslow and Loory's Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam," which was published in
1968. G. HERRING, supra note 2, at xxii. But it is uncertain what impact that fact would have
had on these two Justice Department officials had they known it. As they might have viewed
it, there was an important distinction between a reporter or scholar claiming that Sweden or
Canada or Poland acted as an intermediary, and the publication of government documents
that proved the same point. The former permitted the United States and foreign leaders to
deny the validity of the claim, thus possibly reducing the degree of political embarrassment to
compromised foreign leaders and enhancing the possibility that these foreign governments
would continue to act as go-betweens. The latter undeniably established the intermediary role,
created severe political embarrassment for foreign leaders within their own countries, strained
with the United States, and almost certainly ended that nation's wilUngness to act as an
intermediary.
Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
100 Id.
101 Id. Mardian was not alone in this view that the study, especially the four diplomatic
volumes, contained highly sensitive material. When he prepared the volumes, Gelb treated the
four diplomatic volumes as especially sensitive and permitted only three or four staff members
access to them. G. Herring, supra note 2, at x. And during the litigation over the govern
ment's claim for a prior restraint, Paul Wamke, a former top Pentagon official in the Johnson
Administration, told 20 newsmen at breakfast that public disclosure of diplomatic moves de
tailed in the diplomatic volumes could create such serious problems that the Nixon Adminis-
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Defense and intelligence officials told Mardian that publication
of the classified study compromised intelligence interests.'"^ Mardian
remembered that the National Security Agency pored over the study
and "kept coming up with more and more reasons why this particular
information couldn't be published."*"^ He recalled great concern
among intelUgence officials that the publication of some documents
within the study would reveal covert information sources.'"* He
explained;
the disclosure of the communique would disclose the nature and
location of our intelligence gathering—^in other words, the fact that
we knew of a troop movement within a matter of minutes from the
time it began meant that there could be only one way that we could
have that information.'"'
Laird recently agreed with Mardian's recollection. He maintained
that there were a dozen or so paragraphs, some of which were pub
lished (although he would not specify which paragraphs), which dis
closed intelligence sources.'"^
There was another factor that deeply influenced Mardian. Be
cause government officials were unfamiliar with the Pentagon Papers,
and did not know exactly what documents the Times possessed in
addition to the classified history and the command study, their worst
fears escalated as they speculated about what the next edition of the
newspaper would contain. "On Monday, we weren't sure how bad it
could
Mardian remembered many years later.'"' This only
served to strengthen their conviction that the Times Pentagon Papers
series was at odds with defense and diplomatic interests.
* * *

tration's law suit against the Times was warranted. Berger, Warnke Opposes Publication of
Report on Diplomacy, The Washington Post, June 24, 1971, at A13, col. 1.
102 Mardian Interview, supra note 64; Laird Interview, supra note 82.
103 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
104 Id.
'"5 Id.
106 Whether or not the Pentagon Papers study contained documents that compromised in
telligence secrets became a hotly contested issue during a court hearing on the government's
request for a prior restraint later in the week. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that
defense and intelligence officials reported to Mardian that the Times report threatened intelli
gence interests. Although such officials are often adverse to risk and too easily alarmed by the
disclosure of classified material, there was sufficient cause for concern in this case—given the
magnitude of the classified information involved and its unsifted nature—to make responsible
officials deeply uneasy. Particularly because they really did not know the entire scope of what
might be contained within the Pentagon Papers, because they were completely surprised by the
Times's sudden publication of the material, and because they were compelled to assess the
possible threat to intelligence secrets under great time pressure, it is not surprising that Mard
ian and others were generally apprehensive. Laird Interview, supra note 82.
107 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
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Even though Mardian concluded that further publication by the
Times would harm national security, that did not necessarily mean he
would recommend a suit against the newspaper for a prior restraint.
Mardian could have concluded that future Times installments might
retard the peace process and harm intelligence interests, but that
those potential injuries were too uncertain to warrant a prior re
straint.'"® He might have reasoned that, absent evidence that further
publication would immediately endanger life'"' (as in the publication
of the sailing time and course of a troop ship""), the administration
would lose its effort to stop the Times and be sorely embarrassed.
But that was not to be. Mardian's sense of what the government
ought to do was influenced by his political perspective. As he saw it,
the government should not have to risk harm to the nation's security
while unelected newspaper editors made judgments about which top
secret document to publish."' Rather than emphasize the downside
of suing the Times—the hypothetical nature of the injuries and the
stringent requirements for securing a prior restraint—Mardian ap
proached the matter from the opposite direction. The possibility that
serious harm might result, combined with the fact that prior cases had
not foreclosed the possibility of securing a prior restraint, was the
only opening that Mardian needed before deciding that a suit against
the Times was necessary. Moreover, Mardian considered the press
arrogant, presumptuous and often wrong. He thought that the press's
role in making our political system work fell far short of presuming
the knowledge and authority to declassify top secret documents that
related to a war in progress. In addition, Mardian was from the West,
had been a Goldwater supporter, and was deeply suspicious of what
he viewed as the liberal eastern press. Whatever uncertainty he might
have had about the necessity or wisdom of trying to stop the Pentagon
Papers series was further discounted because it was the Times that
published it."^
Given Mardian's perspective, a prior restraint emerged in his
eyes as the only legal remedy that would protect the national defense.
A criminal prosecution would take many days to begin and a trial
might not be held for months, perhaps a year or more. And even if the
Times were convicted, the imposed penalty would only deter the pa
per from publishing similar material in future situations. The pro108
109
110
111
112

See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
Id.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
Id.
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ceeding would be completely ineffective in preventing the harm to
national security that Mardian feared would occur during the next
few days as the Times continued its series.
Mardian also viewed an action for a prior restraint as a means of
gaining the time he needed to assess the situation. As he recalled
years later, he conceived of a prior restraint action against the Times
as a way of saying: "Hey! Give us a chance to find out how damaging
it is before you go any fiirther.'"" He described his office that Mon
day as chaotic, resembling a crowded railway station at rush hour
with admirals, generals, and national security officials coming and go
ing."'^ There were more people to consult and there was more re
search to do than could be accomplished in the few remaining hours
before the Times went to press again. No one in the administration
(least of all Mardian) thought that the newspaper would respond fa
vorably to an informal request that it delay its planned installments
while government officials assessed the defense implications. Mardian
hoped that he might gain the needed time by obtaining a temporary
restraining order that would bar the Times from publishing additional
excerpts pending an evidentiary hearing."'
But Mardian was only an assistant attorney general. There
would be no lawsuit without Mitchell's approval. Mitchell, however,
fully supported Mardian's assessment that the administration should
try to prevent the Times from publishing further excerpts from the
classified history.
Mitchell spent very little time reviewing the Times matter be
cause he did not think it required his special attention. As he saw it:
"There's so goddamn many things going on in the Justice Department
that it's just another one that you take as it comes along.""^ Mitch
ell's schedule on that Monday included attending a drug conference at
the White House in the morning, a noon meeting with Haldeman, and
«13 Id.
•14 Id.
113 Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted briefly that Mardian
was a very controversial figure during the Nixon years. This was true both inside and outside
the government. W.N. Seymour, Jr. noted in his memoir that Mardian was "widely regarded
both inside and outside the Department as a dangerous man. His constant emphasis on using
the criminal justice system to repress activities by 'subversives' was a source of genuine con
cern." W. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF JUSTICE IN
AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 201 (1975).
Salisbury commented that it was Mardian who gave the Pentagon Papers case its "Kafka
like quality." H. SALISBURY, supra note 9, at 287. Salisbury also quoted Haldeman, who had
a reputation for being abrasive, as saying that: "Mardian was very abrasive. It may sound
funny for me to say that—^but it was true." Id.
•1® Mitchell Interview, supra note 65.
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lunch with Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York.'" Along the
way, he huddled with Klein, Nixon's Communications Director, in
Klein's office to figure out "what was coming next and how we should
handle it.""® But Mitchell never paused long enough to review either
relevant legal precedents, or the actual evidence that the Times series
might threaten national security in some significant way."'
As a result Mitchell endorsed Mardian's recommendations in
large part because Mitchell was completely dependent upon Mard
ian's assessment of the law of prior restraint and the national security
risks."® Mitchell also supported them because he shared Mardian's
political perspectives. Like Mardian, Mitchell saw no reason to
chance the nation's security in the face of claims by Rogers and Laird
that the Pentagon Papers contained material that "would jeopardize
the American Government's relationship with other governments" if
disclosed."' As Mitchell recalled years later, the decision to seek a
prior restraint against the Times was "a very simple thing . . . [since]
nobody in the government believed that the newspapers had carte
blanche to publish anything they wanted to that was inimical to the
best interest of the United States.'"^^
* * *

As convinced as Mardian became that the administration should
sue the Times for a prior restraint, and as powerful as Mitchell was
within the administration, no legal action against the Times was con
ceivable without Nixon's approval. Nixon was certainly furious at the
Times on Monday morning, but he did not consider the possibility of
suing the Times for a prior restraint until the Justice Department
made the suggestion.'^® As Mardian remembers, he himself had more
than one conversation with Haldeman during the day in which Haldeman was skeptical about a prior restraint action. Mardian felt that he
first had t o persuade Haldeman and then, through him, N i x o n . I n
the end, however, Nixon was not difficult to persuade, even though he
117 Id.
1'® H. KLEIN, supra note 41.
'1' Id. at 344; Mitchell Interview, supra note 65.
•20 Mitchell's minimal involvement in what he later termed this "monumental law suit"
against the Times was typical of him. Mitchell had not wanted to become Attorney General
and was not primarily interested in running the Justice Department. Mitchell Interview, supra
note 65. Indeed, the political commentator, Richard Harris, quoted Mitchell at the time as
saying; " 'This is the last thing in the world I wanted to do.'" R. HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE
CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA 105 (1970).
•21 Mitchell Interview, supra note 65.
•22 Id
•23 Sgg supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
•24 Mardian Interview, supra note 64.
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had decided on Sunday morning that his administration should not
interfere with the Times publication plans. As for the skepticism that
Mardian encountered, it may have been attributable merely to the fact
that Nixon and Haldeman needed some time to become accustomed
to the idea that the administration would take legal action. By late
afternoon, Nixon had given his approval.
In his memoirs, Nixon claimed that he approved the prior re
straint action against the Times because the National Security Agency
was "immediately worried"'^' that some of the "more recent docu
ments could provide code-breaking clues;"the CIA was "worried
that past or current informants would be exposed;"'^' the State De
partment was "alarmed"'^® because the study "would expose South
east Asia Treaty Organization contingency war plans that were still in
eflfect;"'^' and the Times publication "shook"'^° the international
community because the study contained material relating to the secret
role of other governments as diplomatic go-betweens. In addition,
Nixon asserted that the Times publication came at a "particularly
sensitive time" because Kissinger's secret trip to China was only three
and a half weeks away, secret negotiations with North Vietnam were
underway in Paris, and the SALT talks were on-going.'^' Although
Nixon portrayed these considerations as important, he insisted in his
memoirs that there was an "even more fundamental reason for taking
action to prevent publication.""^ Nixon claimed that an important
principle was at stake in this case:
[I]t is the role of the government, not the New York Times, to
judge the impact of a top secret document. ... If we did not move
against the Times it would be a signal to every disgruntled bureau
crat in the government that he could leak anything he pleased
while the government simply stood by."^
Nixon's explanation for why he approved the suit against the
Times is incomplete and misleading. As we have seen, Nixon's reac
tion to the Times publication evolved from Sunday morning when he
decided that his administration should do nothing to interfere with
the Times publication; to Monday morning, when he was contemplat125 R. NIXON, R.N.: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 509 (1978).
126 Id.
127 Id at 509.
128 Id at 508.
129 Id at 508-09.
130 Id
131

Id. at

511.

132 Id at 509.
133

Id
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ing criminal proceedings against the Times-, to late Monday after
noon, when he gave the green light to a prior restraint action.
Nevertheless, Nixon's memoirs make no mention of this evolution.'^''
Given that Nixon did a complete reversal from Sunday morning
to Monday afternoon, the reasons he offers for his approval of the
prior restraint action fail to reflect the evolution of his own thinking
as we have seen it develop. Rather, they seem to represent a summary
of the views advanced by Mardian and others, and that were perfectly
acceptable as public positions.
No one can deny that Nixon's approval of the legal action
against the Times may have reflected some apprehension on his part
about intelligence secrets, future unauthorized disclosures, or current
diplomatic initiatives. But given what we know about the events of
Sunday and Monday—Nixon's change of mind, Kissinger's call to
Nixon on Sunday, and Haldeman's claim that it was Kissinger who
caused Nixon to take action against the Times—it seems unlikely that
these factors alone caused Nixon to approve legal action against the
Times. What is more plausible is that these factors made a prior re
straint against the newspaper credible and publicly defensible in
Nixon's mind, but only after Kissinger made Nixon afraid that he
would appear weak if he did nothing. As Nixon's biographer, Stephen
Ambrose, concluded after years of study: "Nixon hated to appear
weak.""^
Once Nixon was willing to take some legal action against the
Times, he did not concern himself with the pros and cons of a crimi
nal prosecution as opposed to a civil action for a prior restraint.
When Mitchell and Mardian recommended that the administration
try to stop the Times from further publication, he reviewed neither
the legal precedents for such a legal offensive nor the evidence sup
porting the claim that the Times series jeopardized national security.
He did not even consult more than one or two White House aides
before approving the action. From Nixon's perspective, if he had to
take legal action against the Times, he was willing to do so following
the Justice Department's lead.
O K *

It is important that national security factors not be seen as the
sole cause of the administration's decision to seek a prior restraint.
This would be as much of a distortion of what actually happened as
the claim that the administration sued to repress the press. Nixon,
after all, seems to have approved the prior restraint action to avoid
134 Id. at 508-15.
135 2 S. AMBROSE, supra note 23 at 271.
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appearing weak to other international leaders and without reviewing
with his aides the national security implications of further publica
tion. But it is equally essential not to underestimate the critical impact
that the nation's security had on the decision to seek a prior restraint.
If Mardian and Mitchell only wanted to take advantage of the
Times Pentagon Papers series to intimidate the press, other, less risky
legal remedies were available. They could have promptly initiated a
grand jury investigation on how the Times secured the classified
study. (Later in the summer, the administration began such an inves
tigation.'^®) Or they could have initiated a grand jury investigation
concerning whether the Times publication violated any espionage
statutes. Either proceeding would have been a powerful and frighten
ing weapon to use against the newspaper. Either would have intimi
dated the press as much as a prior restraint action and probably more
so. Admittedly the administration may not have prevailed, but its
chances of prevailing would probably have been greater in either of
these proceedings than it was in the prior restraint action.
But it was Mardian's and Mitchell's assessment of national se
curity risks that caused them to seek a prior restraint. Indeed, their
recommendation that the administration seek a prior restraint (as op
posed to another legal remedy) is inexplicable unless one accepts the
centrality of national security considerations in their thinking.
II. THE STRENGTH OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM
FOR A PRIOR RESTRAINT
A.

The Allegations

The administration had initially sued the New York Times for a
prior restraint on June 15. While that proceeding was pending, it be
gan a second action'^' only three days later against the Washington
Post, which had secured a large part of the Pentagon Papers and had
begun publishing excerpts from them.'^® Ultimately, both cases were
decided by the Supreme Court, and it would require a complete his
tory of both legal proceedings to carefully parse out the allegations
made and evidence presented by the government in each case. I pro
pose to summarize the government's evidence as embodied in the rec
ord of both cases and presented to the Supreme Court.
136 s. UNGAR, supra note 9, at 283.
137 United States v. The Washington Post, No. 71 Civ. 1235 (D.D.C. June 18, 1971)
(complaint).
138 s. UNGAR, supra note 9, at 130-47.
139 Just a brief word about the record as I have it. I have documents filed in the Court that
were submitted in the prior proceedings, but they are not consecutively numbered, as they
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The administration claimed that further publication by the news
papers would jeopardize the "Vietnamization process" and the cur
rent rate of withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam.'^ It
argued that the United States had been withdrawing its military
forces for the previous eighteen months "at the fastest rate possible
consistent with capabilities of the South Vietnamese armed forces in
taking over the combat role and consistent with the retention of ade
quate military security for the United States forces remaining."'^'
According to the government, the Vietnamization program was pre
mised on the assumption that the "planned support which we expect
from our allies and from the Republic of Vietnam will continue with
out major change,and that this military balance was a "delicate'"'^^ one that had "a high risk of being upset."'^ The government
charged that further publication "will jeopardize the military support
we are receiving from foreign forces,"and if the level of military
strength fell "below prudent risk, an adverse snowballing affect could
not be ruled out'"'*® especially if the North Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong forces achieved a "major localized or tactical victory over the
South Vietnamese forces."'^''
The administration illustrated its claim that further publication
threatened the Vietnamization process in several ways. It asserted
that the public disclosure of some of the documents in the study
would have an impact on "Thai political attitudes, both within coun
try and without,'""^® and that the ability of the United States to use air
bases within Thailand might be threatened as a result."^' The admin
istration claimed that the United States tactical air units and B-S2's
would be in a bound record. Apparently the papers were presented to the Court in a manner
that was more informal than usual because of the great haste of the appeal. Also, several pages
of former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold's sealed brief are missing and about three pages
remain sealed. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the New York Times sealed brief.
Floyd Abrams has stated that he does not have it and government officials have stated that
they cannot locate it.
140 Brief for the United States (Secret Portion) at 5, New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (No. 71 1873) [hereinafter Griswold Secret Brief].
141 Special Appendix Relating to In Camera Proceedings and Sealed Exhibits at 6, United
States V. New York Times (2d Cir. June 21, 1971) (No. 71-1617) [hereinafter Special
Appendix].
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id
146 Id. at 6-7.
147 Id. at 7.
148 Affidavit of Melvin Zais at 6, United States v. The Washington Post, No. 71 Civ. 1235
(D.D.C. June 19, 1971) [hereinafter Zais Affidavit].
149 Id. at 6-7.
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stationed at Thailand bases were "essential to the safety and well-be
ing of the United States forces now deployed in Southeast Asia,'"'° to
the success of the Vietnamization program, and to the "interdiction
program against the enemy supply routes in South Vietnam."''' The
government maintained that without "continued support from the
Republic of Thailand, these air support missions would be substan
tially reduced, permitting the North Vietnamese to build major sup
ply bases in preparation for mounting sizeable force attacks . . .
The government argued that
there is much material in these volumes which might give offense
to South Korea, to Thailand, and to South Vietnam, just as serious
offense has already been given to Australia and Canada. . . .
[Because] [t]he rate at which we can continue this withdrawal
depends upon the extent to which we can continue to rely on the
support of other nations . . . [the withdrawal rate] will be
diminished.'"

Most specifically, the government claimed that further publication
might cause the Government of Korea to withdraw its 49,000 troops
in Vietnam "faster than is currently envisioned."""
The administration asserted that additional publication "could
have some affect [sic] upon the internal political processes" of the
South Vietnamese Government.'" It claimed that the publication
would stimulate "instability""® in the South Vietnamese high com
mand and might cause it
to terminate their cross-border operations and return their partici
pating forces to bolster the security of the homeland. Particularly
in the case of Cambodia, withdrawal of these forces would allow
the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong forces to reestablish the
series of base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border
from which they could mount increased military activity through
out South Vietnam.'"

One consequence of the withdrawal of South Vietnamese military
forces from Cambodia, a government witness concluded, would be to
force "United States forces ... to disrupt supply efforts.'""
The administration claimed that the Pentagon Papers contained
150
151
152
153
154155
156
157
158

Id. at 6.
Id
Id at 7.
Griswold Secret Brief, supra note 140, at 5.
Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 8.
Zais Affidavit, supra note 148, at 8; see also Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 8.
Zais Affidavit, supra note 148, at 8; see also Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 8.
Zais Affidavit, supra note 148, at 9; see also Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 9.
Zais Affidavit, supra note 148, at 9.
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information that might prompt another change in the deployment of
South Vietnamese troops. As one government official stated, the clas
sified documents contained
detailed information . . . [that] carefully documented scenario of
the overthrow of President Diem by Generals Duong Van Minh,
Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, and others. These same individuals
are now deeply involved in preparation for the forthcoming elec
tions in South Vietnam in October 1971. General Minh, who is
expected to be the leading opposition candidate to President Thieu
in these elections could claim that disclosure of the above specifics
by the United States at this time was designed to discredit General
Minh and thereby assure the election of "a puppet regime of Presi
dent Thieu.'""

Another example focused on documents "concerning the period
of the coup d'etat against President Ngo Dinh Diem in November
1963 and United States relations with the successor regimes.'"®" The
administration claimed that these documents revealed "the degree of
direct United States pressures and influence on the Government of
Vietnam some years ago, [and that they also contain] a brutally frank
lecture to Vietnamese generals by the American Ambassador.'"®'
The administration claimed that publication of this information
would "diminish the stature of present Vietnamese political
figures,'"®^ including then President Thieu and Vice President Ky.
The administration maintained that further publication would
endanger the safety of U.S. forces by revealing in "great detail the
processes involved in US decision making.'"®' It claimed that future
publication might disclose plans for bombing North Vietnam,'®* the
capacity of the United States to assess enemy forces,'®® the process for
making United States military decisions and reaction times,'®® current
war planning for Southeast Asia and China,'®' and "deployment
times for major US units.'"®® Therefore, it claimed that the publica
tion of this information would provide "a substantial advantage to the
enemy"'®' and "tip the scales of victory in his favor,""" both on the
•5' Affidavit of Dennis J. Doolin at 2, United States v. The Washington Post, No. 71 Civ.
1235 (D.D.C. June 20, 1971) [hereinafter Doolin Affidavit].
160 Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 19.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 14.
164 Id. at 10.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 3.
167 Id. at 10-11.
168 Id. at 11.
169 Id. at 14.
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battle field and in the political area. The disclosure of this informa
tion, according to the administration, "could have a decided detri
mental impact upon the present Vietnamization program and US
redeployment objectives."^'''
The administration also contended that further disclosure would
"slow the U.S. program of shifting military responsibility in Vietnam
to South Vietnamese forces.""^ It asserted that the publication of
certain information contained in the classified study would "endan
ger""^ the Government of Vietnam's interest in and support of the
pacification program by subjecting the South Vietnam Government
and key officials to ridicule and by causing the Pacification Program
to be considered a United States program rather than a Vietnamese
one. This might result in the diversion of South Vietnam's attention
to less critical programs.
The administration also contended that the classified study con
tained pages that disclosed the planning for and the past conduct of
certain covert operations in North Vietnam."'^ It asserted that the
publication of this information would reveal how these operations are
mounted through United States intelligence activities and that publi
cation of this material could foreclose the future conduct of such op
erations."' The administration warned that the loss of this capability
would eliminate a "military option . . . where the survival of with
drawing forces under attack requires such an option as a decisive fac
tor in military success or failure . . . .""®
The administration also asserted that further publication would
seriously compromise other military interests. It claimed that the
classified documents contained military operational plans that were to
be used to meet "military offensive moves against the United States by
the armed forces of the People's Republic of China.""' The govern
ment conceded that these two 1964 and 1965 plans were no longer in
use, but it insisted that the plans would "reveal possible total force
commitments and planned areas of operation which appear valid for
future operations. Such information, if disclosed to an enemy plan
ner, presumably would, if combined with other intelligence generally
held by the intelligence communities of foreign countries, seriously
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Zais Affidavit, supra note 148, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Special Appendix, supra note 141, 10-11.
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compromise current war planning for Southeast Asia.'"'®
The government claimed that a prior restraint was required to
guard important intelligence matters.'" In his sealed brief to the
Supreme Court, Solicitor Erwin Griswold stated that the classified
document contained "specific references to the names and activities of
CIA agents still active in Southeast Asia.'"®" He also asserted that
the documents contained "references to the activities of the National
Security Agency," although he did not identify the activities.'®' The
administration also claimed that the direct quoting from Saigon Em
bassy messages "would assist [the] enemy in analyzing and possibly
breaking codes employed at that time and thereby all traffic of that
period.'"®' It also argued that further publication might disclose the
extent of the American military capacity to interpret coded messages
of other countries.'®'
The administration claimed that further disclosures would seri
ously harm several important diplomatic interests.'®" It maintained
"8 Id. at 11.
I''' Whether the government claimed that the publication of the Pentagon Papers
threatened intelligence interests during the litigation has itself been a confused issue in the
secondary literature. Both Wise and Salisbury state the government either never made the
claim or conceded that there was no threat after the issue was raised. For example, Salisbury
has stated that at one point during the proceedings before District Judge Gutfein, a Times
attorney asked U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr., whether "codes were going to be
involved in the case" and that Seymour answered "No ... [n]ot at all." H. SALISBURY, supra
note 41, at 298. Wise recounts a moment during the in camera hearing when a government
witness reassured Judge Gurfein that codes then in use could not be broken merely by provid
ing a verbatim transcript of a message the way they could have been at an earlier time. Wise
colorfully stated that the Times officials were so pleased with the witness's statement that they
could have "kissed" him. D. WISE, supra note 25, at 161.
Wise is correct in asserting that a government witness did reassure Gurfein that a verba
tim transcript would not help break a code. But in other respects, Salisbury and Wise are
incorrect on this point.
In papers filed in the Times case in the Second Circuit, Seymour maintained that further
publication would injure intelligence interests. The Nixon Administration also alleged that
further publication by the Washington Post would injure intelligence matters. Furthermore,
the administration presented these claims to the Supreme Court.
18° Griswold Secret Brief, supra note 140, at 5.
Id.
'82 Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 12.
183 S. UNGER, supra note 9, at 204. Unger cites an affidavit signed by Noel Gayler, director
of the National Security Agency at the time, in the Washington Post case. The affidavit was
sealed during the litigation and remains one of the few documents still under seal. Neverthe
less, there is independent support for Unger's claim that it dealt with codes, apart from the
obvious inference that can be drawn from Gayler's position and that the affidavit remains
sealed. During the hearing in the Post case before District Judge Gesell, the judge referred to
the affidavit and mentioned that it concerned codes.
184 Griswold Secret Brief, supra note 140, at 4-5; see also Special Appendix, supra note 141,
at 15-20; Affidavit of William B. Macomber, United States v. The Washington Post, No.71
Civ. 1478 (D.D.C. June 20, 1971) [hereinafter Macomber Affidavit].
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that the United States "has received the cooperation of a number of
third coimtries in carrying out delicate diplomatic missions on sensi
tive and vital issues."'®' The administration claimed that it had ap
proached, and that it continued to approach, other countries, "some
of them not friendly to the United States,'"®® for assistance in negoti
ating an end to the fighting and the release of POWs.'®' It claimed
that further publication would surely embarrass these governments
and foreign officials, making it unlikely that they or others would act
as go-betweens at the behest of the United States. The overall result
would be to "seriously undermine our eflForts to make such
arrangements.'"®®
The classified documents did not merely identify third-party
countries or foreign officials who wanted their roles kept confidential,
they also contained criticisms of the same foreign governments and
officials who had acted as intermediaries.'®' For example, the admin
istration claimed that some documents included "numerous disparag
ing references to Poland and Polish officials,""" and that they "cast
the Poles in an unfavorable light and make it unlikely that they would
act in any future peace negotiations.""' Other documents "imply
criticism""^ of the Italian government, which had also assisted the
United States in its diplomatic efforts.
The administration also asserted that, as a result of the harm to
the diplomatic process caused by disclosures, "more of our men may
die in North Vietnamese prisons.""® It pointed out that the condi
tions of their confinement and their eventual release depended upon
the diplomatic process, and that to the extent that disclosure harmed
the diplomatic effort, the result would eventually be the loss of life for
the United States prisoners of war.""
The administration cited two top secret cables dated February
19, 1967, and March 1, 1968, from Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
in Moscow to the State Department that were contained in the Penta
gon study."' The first summarized a "highly confidential conversa185 Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 15.
>86 Id
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Griswold Secret Brief, supra note 140, at 4-5.
190 Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 20.
191 Macomber Affidavit, supra note 184, at 20.
192 Id.
193 Doolin Affidavit, supra note 159, at 3.
194 Id. ; see also Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 15.
195 Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 17-19; Griswold Secret Brief, supra note 140, at 78.
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tion with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin on Vietnam and China,""®
and the administration claimed that its disclosure that a "top Soviet
leader may have been accommodating to United States interests
places him in a vulnerable position with respect to his colleagues and
thus far less likely to be accommodating in the future.""' The second
cable was marked "LITERALLY EYES ONLY," and contained
Thompson's "careful and detailed assessment of probable Soviet atti
tudes toward various possible United States military actions with re
spect to North Vietnam and possible Soviet countermoves.""® The
administration claimed that the disclosure of this later cable could
provide the Soviets with valuable intelligence"' since Thompson was
widely known as a senior authoritative official adviser on Soviet
Affairs.'°°
The administration identified a 1965 memorandum by Maxwell
Taylor to President Johnson that listed six concessions sought by the
North Vietnamese from the United States and five concessions the
United States sought from the North Vietnamese.'®' It claimed that
the North Vietnamese would gain "a major advantage in any negotia
tions"'®' if they had access to this information. It also claimed that
the North Vietnamese had complained in the past about unauthorized
leaks disclosing negotiations between it and the United States, and
insisted that serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese must be
confidential.'®'
The administration made the general point that "the diplomatic
process simply cannot function if governments do not have confidence
in one another's ability to protect information given to them in confi
dence and classified accordingly."'®^ As one affiant emphatically
stated:
Let me make myself clear. I am not referring here to such rela
tively minor problems as embarrassment or inconvenience. I am
referring to specific and serious damage to United States foreign
policy and security interests. I refer to the mortal damage such
disclosures constitute to the diplomatic process itself. Without
confidence by nations that they can in fact speak to the United
196
197
198
199
200
201

Special Appendix, supra note 141, at 18.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Griswold Secret Brief, supra note 140, at 7.
Id.
Doolin Affidavit, supra note 159, at 1.

202 Id

203 Id.-., United States v. The Washington Post, 71 Civ. 1235 (D.D.C. June 21, 1971) (un
published evidentiary hearing transcript of Dennis J. Doolin at 105(B)-(E)).
204 Macomber Affidavit, supra note 184, at 3.
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States on a confidential basis, there will be no ineaningful Ameri
can diplomatic process. And without a functioning diplomatic
process, the United States has lost an essential part of its national
security effort and its principal instrument for resolving disputes by
peaceful means and seeking a just and enduring peace.^°^

This official. Deputy Under-Secretary for Administration in the
Department of State, William Butts Macomber, also claimed that a
prior restraint was needed so that United States officials would feel
sufficient confidence to provide candid assessments of foreign diplo
matic relations.^*^ As an example, he cited Ambassador Llewellyn
Thompson's detailed cables which summarized his views about the
Soviet Union.^°'
Macomber also asserted that the administration needed a prior
restraint to preserve the flexibility of the diplomatic process. He as
serted that criminal remedies were not adequate and that uiiless the
administration secured a prior restraint it would be forced to institute
"security precautions so cumbersome and stringent that the Depart
ment of State ... would not be able to function with even a modicum
of efficiency."^"® Macomber wrote that the "stakes are too high to
permit such a result,"^"' and he concluded; "If, as is generally con
ceded, the publication of the departure of a single troop ship can
properly be enjoined, where no more than a few hundred lives are
involved, there should be no question but that disclosures can be en
joined which pose incomparably greater perils."^'"
B. Assessing the Allegations
The administration's claim for a prior restraint has been dis
counted because of the general assumption that the administration's
allegations of harm were general and not supported by specific refer
ence to the classified documents in dispute. It turns out that both
assumptions are false. As reviewed above, the government made
many concrete allegations and it provided numerous references to the
top secret study in support of them.^''
The sufficiency of the government's allegations in the case are
205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 3-4.
Id. ax 17-18.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 4.
Id.
210 Id.
211 The number of references the government made to the Pentagon Papers to support its
allegations increased substantially as the case was appealed. As I have counted the references
in the documents available to me, the number of citations were as follows:
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best put into perspective by focusing upon two factors. The first is the
nature of the threatened harm. The injury in Chief Justice Hughes's
famed troop ship hypothetical^'^ was loss of life. None of the govern
ment's allegations in the Pentagon Papers Case involved a troop ship
and sailing dates, but they did involve loss of life. The government
District Courts
New York Times case
Washington Post case

6
17

Court of Appeals
New York Times case

21

Supreme Court
Both cases
65
I am unable to provide a count of the citations in the D.C. Circuit because I do not have the
documents submitted to the D.C. Circuit in the Washington Post case that were sealed.
Three points should be made about these references and the pattern they disclose. First, a
reference might have been to just one page, but it is more likely that it was to several pages or
to a whole volume or more, as in the case of the four volumes tracing the diplomatic history of
the war from 1964-1968.
Second, the fact that so few references to the study provided to Judge Gurfein in the
Times case was caused by the refusal of the government's witnesses to disclose why they be
lieved that further publication of the Pentagon Papers would injure national security, at least
so long as the Times lawyers and officials were in the courtroom. Because of obvious constitu
tional protections. Judge Gurfein refused to hear the evidence privately. Moreover, as U.S.
Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr., has recounted, the government witnesses even refused
to disclose the reasons why further publication would harm national security and supporting
references to the government lawyers. See W. SEYMOUR, supra note 115, at 198-204.
After Judge Gurfein dissolved the temporary restraining order, the government's wit
nesses were shocked and agreed to confide their concerns to the government lawyers and to
permit the lawyers to make a full presentation to the appeals court. As a result, the number of
citations provided to the Second Circuit increased substantially. This had a direct spill-over
affect onto the action against the Washington Post for, although it was begun on Friday, June
18, the day Judge Gurfein presided over an evidentiary hearing. Judge Gesell did not hold an
evidentiary hearing until Monday, June 21. That explains why the number of citations pro
vided Gesell was much larger than the number given to Gurfein, although I cannot explain
why the number given Gesell was not the same as that provided the Second Circuit.
Third, most of these references to the study were not explicated by government witnesses
during the evidentiary hearings. This was certainly true for the references not provided at the
trial level. But it was also true in the main for the references that were provided. The wit
nesses limited their testimony to explaining the allegations and did not explain how the refer
ences to the classified documents supported them. There were at least two reasons for this.
First the time available to government witnesses during the in camera hearings was limited.
Second the government lawyers had the impression that the trial judges were going to review
the passages the witnesses referred to. There is always the possibility that the witnesses did not
explain the citations because the witnesses believed that they did not support the allegations.
But I do not think that. I believe that the government was mainly concerned with explaining
the allegations and convincing the judges that the allegations were legally sufficient.
One last point, some of the material referred to remains classified to this day. See supra
notes 131-41, 179 & 183 and accompanying text.
212 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); see also supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
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argued that further disclosures would slow up the rate of Vietnamization, thereby decreasing the withdrawal rate of United States combat
troops and increasing the risk of harm or death to United States
soldiers for a longer time. It argued that further disclosures would
undercut negotiations through third party governments and foreign
officials, which in turn would undermine the possibilities for a negoti
ated end to the fighting and the release of the POWs, both of which
could result in death or injury. It maintained that future disclosures
could threaten intelligence interests, and could undermine military
plans still in effect, thus forcing the United States to rely upon inferior
plans that put the lives of United States soldiers in greater danger.
The second factor is the probability that injury will result from
publication. The government's claim for a prior restraint is enhanced
as the probability of injury increases. This would seem to be the point
of the troop ship example. But in the end, one cannot escape conjec
ture. That is also the lesson of the troop ship example. If a newspaper
publishes the sailing time and course of a troop ship, a commanding
officer might delay departure or change course, or the enemy might
refrain from attacking or be repelled if it did. So merely characteriz
ing the administration's claims in the Pentagon Papers case as conjec
tural is not legally fatal. What is required is an evaluation of the
probability that injury will result from publication. In the troop ship
hypothetical, it must be assumed that the probability of harm is very
high, accepting that a more precise evaluation is impossible.
But what was the probability that harm would result from pubhcation in the Pentagon Papers Case? Apart from Solicitor General
Griswold's claim that the classified documents contained the names of
CIA agents, no one said that these disclosures would lead to the direct
and immediate death of United States soldiers as might the disclosure
of troop locations to an enemy during a war. Certainly no one stated
that injury to United States soldiers would inevitably result from pub
lication, as Justice Brennan stated that he would require before he
granted a prior restraint.^'^
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur
ring).
"Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kinder^ to imperiling the safety of a trans
port already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order." Id.
Justice Brennan's use of the word "inevitably" is odd, suggesting, as it does,' that the
requirements for securing a prior restraint are impossible to satisfy. And yet, in the same
sentence, he concedes the theoretical availability of a prior restraint. In a recent interview, I
called Justice Brennan's attention to the inherent tension in the legal standard he defined. He
explained that his opinion was written on the assumption that the government could secure a
prior restraint in some very narrowly defined circumstances, but that he did not wish to use a
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At the same time, the administration's allegations were certainly
serious—they implicated life, intelligence matters, and important dip
lomatic potential—and they were sufficiently plausible that they could
not be dismissed as farfetched or incredible. Indeed, they were not
only plausible, but entirely possible, if not likely to occur. Certainly it
would be impossible to conclude otherwise without a careful review of
all the evidence in the case, which did not occur. Moreover, while
one might not be able to identify a particular claim and persuasively
argue that its occurrence would be immediate and direct, it was en
tirely conceivable that at least one or more of the dozens of govern
ment allegations would result in immediate and direct harm of some
serious gravity.
Nevertheless, the administration did lose. And although the posi
tions of Justices Black,^'^ Douglas^'' and MarshalP'^ would have de
nied the administration a prior restraint regardless of the substance of
the administration's claim, that was not true for Justices Brennan,^''
Stewart^'® and White.^" For them it would appear that as strong as
the government's claim was, it was not strong enough to satisfy the
requirement of immediate and direct irreparable harm. Thus, for
these three Justices whose votes decided the outcome, the adminis
tration's strong allegations and proof were nevertheless legally insuffi
cient to warrant a prior restraint.
word any less demanding than inevitably in order to convey his belief that it should not be
granted unless the government's evidence satisfied the heaviest of burdens. Interview with
Justice Brennan, former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Brennan Interview].
214 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714-20 (Black, J., concurring).
215 See id. at 720-24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
216 See id. at 740-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
217 See id. at 724-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
218 See id. at 727-030 (Stewart, J., concurring).
219 See id. at 730-40 (White, J., concurring).
220 Because there were three dissents, any two vote changes would have altered the
outcome.
221 Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has maintained that although the administra
tion did not secure a prior restraint, the material he identified in his sealed brief to the Supreme
Court as threatening national security was not published by the press. Interview with Erwin
Griswold, former Soliciter General, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1988).
Briefly it is worth noting how developments within the Times leading to its publication of
the Pentagon Papers series lends circumstantial support to the government's claim that the
Pentagon Papers contained information that would seriously harm national security if pub
lished.
A debate within the Times over whether or not to publish the series began as soon as the
newspaper's officials learned that Neil Sheehan had acquired the classified study and continued
until the evening of June 14, 1971, when the Nixon Administration sent the Times a telegram
requesting that it cease publication of the series. The debate—quarrel might be a more accu
rate description—involved the reporters working on the story, the newspaper's senior editors.
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III. THE HASTE OF THE LITIGATION

The haste of this litigation severely diminished the ability of the
government, which had the burden of going forward, to present its
best case, and the capacity of the judges, who had to make the deci
sion, to study the relevant materials and to deliberate over legal and
factual issues central to the judgment. Thus, free press values not
only triumphed over national security considerations in this case, but
over due process concerns as well. An appreciation of this claim re
quires a brief tour through this massive litigation.
The New York Times began to publish the Pentagon Papers on
June 13.^^^ The administration initiated suit against it on June 15.^^^
The Supreme Court made public its judgment in the Times and the
Post cases on June 30."'^ In between these dates, there were eviden
tiary hearings in two district courts,two court of appeals argu
ments,^^® and full briefing for an unusual Saturday morning oral
argument in the Supreme Court.^^'
Although some officials within the Pentagon began to evaluate
the national security consequences of the Times's publication on Sun
day, June 13,^^® it was not until the next day that the administration
began a systematic evaluation of the publication under the direction
the publisher and his top assistants, the newspaper's in-house general counsel, and the Times s
outside attorneys at the New York law firm Lord Day & Lord.
The Times people were concerned about whether the papers were authentic and whether
they warranted the resources it would take to publish a series bas^ upon them. But they were
also
about the national security implications of publication and the possibility of
criminal liability of publishing them.
Harrison Salisbury recounts in Without Fear or Favor that m^y Times officials met on
April 20,1971, to consider whether or not to go ahead with the project. H. SALISBURY, supra
note 9, at 118-24. At the end of the meeting, Salisbury wrote that James Goodale, in-house
counsel for the New York Times, "white faced, warned, '[ejveryone has to remember. Be Quiet!
Because everyone in this room may have participated in a felony.' " Id. at 123. Goodale was
not alone in making this warning. On two occasions the attorneys from Lord Day & Lord
warned top Times officials that publication of the classified material would violate the espio
nage laws. Id. at 171. These warnings were taken seriously by some at the Times, especially
by Abe Rosenthal, the managing editor, and Arthur Sulzberger, the Times publisher, who took
the unusual step of retaining approval over the series until shortly before publication. Id. at
202.

222
Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involve
ment, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at Al, col. 5.
223 See supra note 4.
224 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
225 See supra note 5.
226 See supra note 7.
227 Graham, Supreme Court Weighs Issues On Vietnam Series After Pleas; Rejects a U.S.
Secrecy Request, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1971, at Al, col. 5.
228 Friedheim Interview, supra note 97.
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of Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian.^^' At that time
Mardian could identify only one person within the Nixon Administra
Others,
tion as being familiar with the forty-seven volume study.
who eventually became witnesses in the case, were not asked to pre
pare to become witnesses until Wednesday, less than two days before
the Friday evidentiary hearing.
Moreover, these witnesses did not
meet the lawyers who would take their direct testimony and be their
guardians during cross examination until Friday morning, just before
the public adjudication of the government's prior restraint claim began.^^^ Because the administration's attorneys were divided as to
what the government's legal theory should be,^^^ and because the wit
nesses were chosen by Washington ofRcials,^^'* the courtroom lawyers
were further handicapped by the fact that the witnesses refused not
only to disclose the most sensitive material that would have strength
ened the government's claim for the relief it sought in a courtroom,
but they flatly refused to discuss it even with the government
lawyers.^^'
The government lawyers made some of its difliculties known to
229 See supra notes 62-122 and accompanying text.
230 That individual was Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter
national Security Affairs. See supra note 80.
231 Two witnesses, Francis J. Blouin and William Butz Macomber, did not begin to prepare
their testimony until Wednesday, June 16. United States v. New York Times, 71 Civ. 2662 at
104, 114 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1971) (transcript of unpublished evidentiary hearing).
232 Interview with Michael D. Hess, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, in New York, N.Y.
(Nov. 23, 1987 and Mar. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Hess Interview].
233 Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian and Defense Department's General Coun
sel, Fred Buzhardt, insisted that the administration argue that the government was entitled to
a preliminary injunction if it could prove that the disputed documents were classified and that
their classification was proper and that the newspapers were not authorized to disclose classi
fied material. United States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr., and Solicitor General Erwin Griswold were not unwilling to press this theory, but they wanted to respond to the
newspapers claim that the first amendment barred a prior restraint absent a direct and immedi
ate grave threat to national security. Because Mardian and Buzhardt selected the government
witnesses and supervised their preparation, the witnesses were totally unprepared for the scope
of examination that the newspapers' attorneys and the trail judges insisted upon.
234 See Mardian Interview, supra note 64; Hess Interview, supra note 232.
235 W. SEYMOUR, supra note 115, at 198-204. Seymour's description of his frustration is
worthy of quotation.
During the preparation of the witnesses to testify at the first hearing before District
Judge Gurfein in New York—all of them senior representatives of the Defense and
State Departments—the prospective witnesses were asked to identify the specific
documents contained in the study which would jeopardize national security. The
reply from the Defense Department counsel, J. Fred Buzhardt, was classic. "They
cannot tell you," he said. "The information is classified."
Id. at 199. Seymour recounts the witnesses' shock when Gurfein dissolved the temporary
restraining order and states that it was only then—after the government had lost the hearing—
that the witnesses discussed the national security matters freely with the government lawyers.
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the appeals court.^^® In fact, the Second Circuit seems to have re
versed Judge Gurfein's decision vacating the temporary restraining
order because of the government's claim that it needed more time to
pinpoint references to the top secret report that would support the
administration's claim.^'' The appeals court directed Gurfein to hold
a second evidentiary hearing and set forth a time table that gave the
government an additional ten days.^^® The importance the Court
placed on free press values in this case cannot be fully appreciated
without acknowledging that the press's right to publish free of a prior
restraint came at the government's reasonable request that it needed a
few more days to prepare for an evidentiary hearing, since the study
in question consisted of 2.5 million words and was prepared by a
Democratic administration no longer in power.
The haste of litigation also took its toll on the ability of the Jus
tices to study the briefs, record, and top secret documents in the case.
It is quite clear that the two district court judges, who presided over
the evidentiary hearings, did not review the 7,000 page study. It was
not introduced into evidence before Judge Gurfein until midday Friday.^^' Gurfein left the bench after 10:00 PM that evening, and ac
cording to his law clerk, the judge left the courthouse immediately.^
The next morning Gurfein returned to his chambers early and began
to dictate his opinion, without studying the classified material.^'*' The
opinion was made public at about 2:00 PM that day.^^^
Judge Gesell was similarly rushed in reaching a decision. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court had ordered him to hold an evi
dentiary hearing on the government's claim and to render a judgment
by 5:00 PM Monday, June 21.^^ The Pentagon Papers were not intro236 United States v. New York Times, No. 71-1617 (2d Cir. June 22, 1971) (unpublished
transcript of oral argument).
237 United States v. New York Times, No. 71-1617 at 6-12 (2d Cir. June 22, 1971 (unpub
lished transcript of in camera oral argument).
238 United States v. New York Times, No. 71-1617 at 1 (2d Cir. June 23, 1971) (en banc)
(per curiam) (unpublished opinion).
239 United States v. New York Times, 71 Civ. 2662 at 63-65 (S.D.N.Y., June 18, 1971)
(transcript of unpublished evidentiary hearing).
240 Interviews with Mel Barkin, former law clerk to United States District Judge Murray
Gurfein, in New York, N.Y. (July 13, 1987 and Mar. 7, 1989) [hereinafter Barkin Interview].
241 Id.
242 Graham, Court Denies an U.S. an Injunction to Block Times Vietnam Series; Appeals
Judge Continues Stay, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1971, at A26, col. 8.
243 United States v. Washington Post, 446 F.2d. 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Washington Post, No. 71-1478 (D.C. Cir. June 18, 1971) (per curiam) (unpublished order
directing the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render a judgment by 5:00
PM on June 21, 1971).
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duced into evidence until mid-day Monday.^'^ The judge did not
leave the bench until about 3:00
He rendered his judgement
with a supporting opinion by the five o'clock deadline.
He did not
have time to study the disputed top Secret documents.
It is likely that most of the court of appeals judges who decided
the Times or the Post case did not review the classified documents.
The majority of the Second Circuit judges reversed and remanded
District Judge Gurfein's order to afford the government more time to
present its case without ever reaching the question of whether further
disclosures from the classified papers would injure national secur
ity.^'*' The majority of the District of Columbia judges appear to have
limited their review to whether District Judge Gesell's judgment was
supported by the record, without making their independent review of
the top secret documents themselves.''*®
The Justices on the high Court were in a similarly difficult posi
tion. The forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon Papers arrived in the
Supreme Court building on Friday, June 25, about 6:00 PM, and were
placed in a room under guard.'^® From roughly 7:00 PM to 10:00 PM.
Justice Brennan studied the classified documents, and, as he recal
led,'^" so did Justice White. Justice Brennan has no memory of any
other Justice coming to review the top secret documents during the
time he was at the court."'
The Justices assembled the next morning at 8:30 am'^' to con
sider the government's ex parte motion'®' for an in camera oral argu244 United States v. Washington Post, No. 71 Civ. 1235 (D.D.C. June 21, 1971) (transcript
of unpublished evidentiary hearing). At 10:00 AM, the papers were not in the courthouse. Id.
at 101. But by 2:30 PM, they had already been introduced into evidence. Id. at 220. There
fore, it seems likely that the documents did not arrive at the courthouse until midday.
245 Id. at 251-52.
246 Id at 266-72.
247 United States v. New York Times, No. 71-1617 (2d Cir. June 23, 1971) (en banc) (per
curiam) (unpublished opinion).
248 United States v. Washington Post, 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
249 Brennan Interview, supra note 213.
250 Id.
251 Id
252 Id
253 Id. The government's ex parte motion was denied by a vote of six to three. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun voted to grant the motion, and Justices Black
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall voted to deny the motion. Justice Douglas's
notes on the conference in which the Justices considered the ex parte motion contain the fol
lowing notation "HLB [Hugo L. Black] insisted that no notes be taken in this conference as
they would be bound to leak out somewhere!" Handwritten notes of Justice William O. Doug
las from the "conference" on cases 1873 and 1885, (June 26, 1971, William O. Douglas Papers,
Box 1519, Manuscripts Division Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Notes].
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ment. That meeting lasted two hours.^®'* It was followed shortly by a
two hour oral argument, which in turn was followed by the Justices'
conference on the case.^'^ During the conference, eight of the Justices
indicated how they intended to vote, and the ninth. Justice Stewart,
stated only a tentative decision.^'® In other words, by the time the
Justices voted in the case, it is likely that only two of them had time to
review the documents in dispute. Under these circumstances. Chief
Justice Burger's statements seem like an accurate description of one
critical aspect of the case: "We do not know the facts of the cases. No
District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew all
the facts. No member of this Court knows all the facts.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The Court's per curiam opinion did state that the government
must satisfy a heavy burden when it seeks a prior restraint, but that
was all it stated. It did not define what it meant by the term "heavy
burden," and with the critical portion of the record sealed and beyond
the public's reach, it has not been possible until now to assess what
the Court may have meant by the term and how the Court evaluated
the strength of the government's evidence in the case. But the evi
dence reviewed in this article permits us for the first time to give
meaning to the term heavy burden, at least as Justices Brennan, Stew
art and White, who conceded the theoretical availability of prior re
straint, probably meant it.^'®
To secure a prior restraint, the government must identify specific
documents that the press possesses; it must claim that their disclosure
will threaten life. Further, the documents it so identifies must be
readily understood by a judge. The government must also establish
that there is the highest likelihood that the harm alleged will follow
immediately and directly upon publication. Merely establishing that
grave harm will possibly result—even if the possibility is highly plau
sible—is insufficient.
These requirements mean that a judge should not defer to gov
ernment witnesses when assessing the government's claim for a prior
restraint. The government cannot prevail if its witnesses allege serious
Id.
255 Graham, Supreme Court Weighs Issues on Vietnam Series After Pleas; Rejects a U.S.
Secrecy Request, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1971, at Al, col. 6.
256 Douglas Notes, supra note 253. Justice Douglas's Conference notes contain the follow
ing notation: "PS he is close to position of WJB [William J. Brennan] and BW [Byron White]
but has not yet voted . . ." Id.
252 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 748 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
258 See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714; supra notes 217-19.
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harm, but do not explain the causal connection between publication of
the documents in dispute and the threatened harm. The government
witness must be able to explain the linkage between publication and
injury and a judge must make her own finding that such a legally
sufficient causal connection exists.
These requirements also mean that the government must be able
to satisfy its evidentiary burden almost immediately upon request.^''
For example, Judge Gurfein gave the government only three days to
prepare for an evidentiary hearing even though there were 7,000 pages
in dispute. Moreover, a judge should not relax this requirement for
an immediate evidentiary hearing by making an independent evalua
tion of the newsworthiness of the information in dispute. In the Pen
tagon Papers case, newsworthiness remained a matter solely for the
press to assess.
Giving meaning to the term "heavy burden" is important, even if
the process is inductive and the meaning can be attributed to only
three Justices in the majority.^®" The Pentagon Papers case was the
first time the government tried to stop the press from publishing infor
mation it possessed because of national security considerations.^®' It
did so while the nation was at war—the United States still had over
140,000 troops fighting a land war in Southeast Asia,^®^ and before
the last troops were withdrawn, over 58,000 of them would die.^®^
Moreover the government's allegations of harm were serious. The
Nixon Administration claimed that the: secret Pentagon study con
tained information that, if disclosed, would threaten lives,^®^ disrupt
diplomacy intended to save lives,^®' and compromise intelligence in
tended to protect lives.^®® And yet the administration lost.
The result was an extraordinary triumph for the press. The liti259 In this article I do not address the propriety of the temporary restraining orders that
were granted in the Times and the Post cases.
260 Sgg supra notes 217-19.
261 The Court had decided cases that were relevant to the disposition in the Pentagon Pa
pers case, the most well known being Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But Near
certainly was not dispositive of the case. See supra note 67. In addition, the massive size of the
government documents in this case combined with the fact that the nation was at war, were
factors that could have been used (but were not) to distinguish this case from the those decided
during the previous dozen years favoring first amendment values.
262 s. KARNOW, VIETNAM 685 (1983).
263 G. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM 19501975 at 256 (1986). According to Herring, official American estimates placed the number of
South Vietnamese battle deaths at 107,504 and North Vietnamese and Vietcong at more than a
half million. Id.
264 See supra notes 137-210 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
266 See. e.g., supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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gation tested the strength of a society's commitment to a free press,
and the fact that free press values trumped those of national security
and due process makes the outcome of exceptional importance in de
fining the role of the press in the democratic process.
Although my focus has been on its legal significance, it would be
an oversight in an article that took a retrospective look at this historic
htigation not to comment, even briefly, on its political significance.
The impact of this case on the Nixon Administration was overwhelm
ing. The conflict over the Pentagon Papers constituted a major turn
ing point in the Nixon Presidency, for it significantly contributed to a
climate within the administration that made possible events that led
to Watergate and the cover-up and that ultimately forced Nixon to
resign.
The Nixon Administration was surely ripe with paranoia before
the Times began its famous series.^®' Nixon thought that the national
press was unfairly against him,^®® that Democratic holdovers in his
administration were subverting his mandate to govern by selectively
leaking damaging documents,^®' and that Hoover and the FBI were
ineffective in protecting him from his political enemies.^'® But the
lawsuit against the Times intensified and magnified the White House
fox-hole mentality and its we-versus-them view of the world. The sys
tematic leaks of the Pentagon Papers during the litigation convinced
Nixon and his aides that a broad conspiracy did exist.^'* The unwill267 See H. KLEIN, supra note 41, at 345.
268 Id.
269 S. HERSH, supra note 24, at 86.
270 R. NIXON, supra note 125, at 595-99; see also R. POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE
LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 470, 588 n.79 (1987).
271 J. LUKAS, supra note 38, at 70; R. NIXON, supra note 125, at 513.
Lukas summarized his findings as follows:
[0]n July 6 [1971] the President, John Ehrlichman, and John Mitchell met at the
White House and, according to Ehrlichman, the attorney general said he believed
Ellsberg had "Communist ties and was part of a conspiracy." The concern about a
conspiracy was also fed by an FBI report which said that a group in Massachu
setts' had duplicated the Pentagon Papers in Cambridge. And there was further
consternation when Robert Mardian reported that some of the papers had been
delivered to the Soviet embassy on June 17 . . . .
J. A. LUKAS, supra note 38, at 70.
Nixon wrote in his memoirs
In early July, John Mitchell reported that the Justice Department had continuing
inHifatinns that Ellsberg had acted as part of a conspiracy; we received a report
that the Soviet Embassy in Washington had received a set of the Pentagon Papers
before they had been published in the New York Times; I was told that some of the
documents provided to the newspapers were not even part of the McNamara
study. Once again we were facing the question: what more did Ellsberg have, and
what else did he plan to do?
R. NIXON, supra note 125, at 513.
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ingness of the press to cooperate with the administration strengthened
Nixon's conviction that the press was out to destroy his authority.
The reactions of the courts to the administration's legal claims^'' and
of the F.B.I, to the President's requests for help^'"* reinforced Nixon's
disposition that he had to take on his enemies by himself.
As a result, the administration took the offensive with a ven
geance. Most immediately, it prosecuted Daniel Ellsberg^'' (who was
thought to have leaked the top secret document), suspended the se
curity clearance of the RAND Corporation^^® (at which the classified
study was stored and from which Ellsberg took the study for photo
copying), and investigated Neil Sheehan^'^ (the Times reporter who
broke the story). Senator GraveP^® (who released a set of the Penta
gon Papers), and the Beacon Press^"'' (which published the Gravel
set).
But those were not the administration's most devastating actions.
Nixon decided that he needed an extra-legal investigatory capability
that he directly controlled. He authorized the "plumbers unit" and
located it in the White House.^®° It was this unit that burglarized
Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office^®' and was (of course), later responsible
for the break-in of the Democratic Party headquarters at the Water
gate in June 1972.^®^ Moreover, it was only after the Pentagon Papers
Case that the administration began to consider a long list of far
fetched schemes such as fire-bombing the Brookings Institute,^®®
which Nixon viewed as an arm of the Democratic Party, a source of
anti-administration leaks, and a storeroom for classified government
272 Haldeman's notes of his meeting with Nixon on June 13, 1971, record Nixon as referring
to the Times decision to publish excerpts from the Pentagon Papers as traitorous, and his notes
of his meeting with the President on the 14th summarize Nixon's orders to cut the Times off
from news sources within the executive branch. See Haldeman Notes, supra note 44, and
accompanying text.
273 See, e.g.. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
274 R. NIXON, supra note 125, at 513.
275 POJ A history of the government's prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg, see P. SCHRAG,
supra note 9.
276 Smith, Laird Increases Security On Papers at Rand Corp., N.V. Times, July 3, 1971, at
Al, col; 2.
277 P. SCHRAG, supra note 9, at 143.
278 N.V. Times, Sept. 9, 1971, at A16, col. 1; see also P. SCHRAG, supra note 9, at 143.
Raymont, Publisher Calls Beacon Press Case Threat to Freedom, N.V. Times, July 18,
1972, at A13, col. 1; see also P. SCHRAG, supra note 9, at 143.
280 R. POWERS, supra note 270, at 469-70.
281 p. SCHRAG, supra note 9, at 108-17.
282 R, POWERS, supra note 270, at 470.
283 G. GORDON LIDDY, WILL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF G. GORDON LIDDY 171-72
(1980).
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documents pilfered by Leslie Gelb and Mort Halperin.^®'^ It was also
after the Pentagon Papers case that the administration prepared an
"enemies list" that included the names of many members of the
press.^®' The administration's experience when it sued the Times and
the other newspapers tipped Nixon and his advisors toward, to use
Mary McCarthy's exquisite phrase, the "politics of irrationality,"^®®
made possible the "White House horrors," as former Attorney Gen
eral John Mitchell characterized them,^®' and prompted Nixon to en
gage in a cover-up that led to his undoing.^®®
The Pentagon Papers case also provides a critical perspective on
one of the central dilemmas of our time. Many former government
officials consider the Pentagon Papers Case unique,^®' and in many
respects they are correct. The Pentagon Papers study itself was the
"pure filet"^®® of government reports, as one government official de
scribed it, and its leak was the single largest, unauthorized disclosure
of classified documents in the nation's history. The Nixon Adminis
tration's suit against the Times was the first time that any administra
tion had resorted to the courts to stop the press from publishing
material it already possessed.^"
But emphasis on the case's uniqueness causes one to miss the
links between the Pentagon Papers Case and larger trends of national
importance. The emergence of the United States as the world's domi
nating power since the close of World War II has given rise to serious
tensions between national security and its demands for secrecy on the
one hand, and democracy and its requirement for accountable polit284 See id.
285 s. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 104
(1990).
286 M. MCCARTHY, THE MASK OF STATE: WATERGATE PORTRAITS 152 (1974).
287 S. KUTLER, supra note 285, at 9.
288 See generally S. KUTLER, supra note 285.
289 Nixon referred to the leak of the Pentagon Papers as the "most massive leak of classified
documents in American history." R. NIXON, supra note 125, at 508. Former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger referred to the leak as a "massive hemorrhage of state secrets." H.
KISSINGER, supra note 48, at 730.
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has stated that he knows of no comparable leak of
classified documents or of a similar law suit. Interviews with Dean Rusk, former Secretary of
State (November 18, 1988 and December 18, 1988). Similar opinions have been expressed by
former Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach and former Assistant Secretary of De
fense Paul Wamke. Interview with Nicholas Katzenbach, former Deputy Secretary of State
(January 3, 1989); Interview with Paul Wamke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (April
20, 1989).
290 Testimony of Dennis J. Doolin, United States v. New York Times, No. 71 Civ. 2662
(S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1971) (unpublished transcript of in camera evidentiary hearing).
291 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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ical processes on the other.
Placing the Pentagon Papers Case
within this context puts it on common ground with innumerable
events including the free press cases of the seventies,the recent cur
tailment of speech within the executive branch,^'"* as well as the IranContra affair.
But few, if any, episodes better illuminate this conflict between
the claims of security and democracy than the Pentagon Papers Case.
Furthermore, in recent years, national security claims have seemed
overpowering. In the name of national security, courts suppress
speech,^'® a President muzzles government officials,^'"' members of the
executive branch by-pass congressionally imposed restraints on
foreign relations,^'® and the press is unduly deferential to the
government.^'®
The Pentagon Papers Case stands in sharp contrast to these con
temporary trends. It offers a distinctive perspective to balancing the
needs of democracy and security. As District Judge Murray Gurfein
wrote in the early morning hours®°° on the day he dissolved the tem
porary restraining order he had granted barring the Times from fur
ther publishing its series:
The security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone. Security
also lies in the value of our free institutions. A cantankerous press,
an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in
authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of
expression and the right of the people to know . . . .
These are troubled times. There is no greater safety valve for
discontent and cynicism about the affairs of Government than free
dom of expression in any form. This has been the genius of our
institutions throughout our history. It has been the credo of all
our Presidents. It is one of the marked traits of our national life
that distinguish [sic] us from other nations under different forms of
292 See generally S. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM; AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE
1938 (1986); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY (1974); M.
HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO
KNOW (1977); S. TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION (1986).
293 Snepp V. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); United States v. The Progressive,
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
294 See D. DEMAC, LIBERTY DENIED 101 (1990).
295 See THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT: THE FULL TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPE
CIAL REVIEW BOARD (1987).
296 See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. 507; Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309.
297 Sgg supra note 294.
298 Supra note 295.
299 M. HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE: THE PRESS AND THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 299
(1989).
300 Barkin Interview, supra note 240.
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government.^"'
The outcome of the Pentagon Papers Case affirms one set of val
ues in the ideological struggle between democracy and security. It
reminds us that courts can reject national security claims without im
periling the nation, that a strong nation requires a free press, and that
the power of the state itself depends upon preserving the public trust.
It can (and should), if its full meaning is comprehended, also
strengthen our collective resolve to trust that the press knows how to
report the news, essentially free of governmental censorship, without
gravely injuring the nation's security in the bargain. At least that,
along with a deep suspicion that government cannot be trusted to dis
cipline its use of power, must be our hope.
United States v. New York Times, No. 71 Civ. 2662 at 668-69 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,1971)
(unpublished opinion).

